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The Elasticity of Taxable Income over the 1980s and 1990s

The Elasticity of Taxable Income
over the 1980s and 1990s*
Abstract - Taxable (and broad) income elasticities are estimated using
tax return data from 1979 to 2001. Data from the Continuous Work
History Survey (CWHS) yield an estimated taxable income elasticity for the 1990s that is about half the corresponding 1980s estimate.
Estimates from the full Statistics of Income, which heavily oversamples
high–income filers, generally confirm the CWHS results. More sophisticated income control brings the estimates for the two decades
closer together—to 0.40 for the 1980s and 0.26 for the 1990s. Work by
Kopczuk (2005) implies that the narrowing of the tax base since 1986
could account for 14 to 29 percent of the remaining difference.

INTRODUCTION

T

he degree to which taxes alter U.S. economic activity and
tax–reporting behavior is a subject of debate. Estimates of
the effect range from extremely large to almost none. For even
modest changes to tax rates, the range of estimates implies
differences in deadweight loss and income–tax revenue of
many tens of billions of dollars. A key variable at the center
of recent research is the elasticity of taxable income (ETI),
which measures the responsiveness of reported taxable
income to changes in marginal tax rates.1 The ETI, if accurately
estimated, can be used to calculate both the change in deadweight loss2 and the change in income–tax revenue resulting
from a change in tax rates.3 However, in practice, assessing
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1
Speciﬁcally, the ETI equals the percentage change in reported taxable income
associated with a one–percent increase in the net–of–tax rate, where the
net–of–tax rate equals one minus the marginal tax rate.
2
Feldstein (1999) shows that deadweight loss = –0.5 · (TaxRate)2 · (1 – TaxRate)–1
· ETI · TaxableIncome.
3
The change in income tax revenue equals ETI · TaxableIncome · Δt · (t/1 – t),
where t is the tax rate. This can be derived as follows:
⎛ dTaxRevenue ⎞ ⎛
1− t
⎞
ETI = Elasticity of Taxable Income = ⎜
⋅⎜
⎟
⎝ d(1 − t) ⎟⎠ ⎝ TaxRevenue ⎠
⎛ TaxRevenue ⎞
⎛ t ⎞
⎛ dTaxRevenue ⎞
⇒ ⎜
= ETI ⋅ ⎜
⎟ = ETI ⋅ TaxableIncome ⋅ ⎜ 1 − t ⎟ .
1− t
d(1 − t) ⎟⎠
⎝
⎠
⎝
⎠
⎝
Therefore, assuming a constant elasticity over the tax change, the change
in revenues for a change in the tax rate (Δt) can be expressed such that
⎛ dTaxRevenue ⎞
⎛ t ⎞
Δt ⋅ ⎜
= ETI ⋅ TaxableIncome ⋅ Δt ⋅ ⎜
.
⎝ 1 − t ⎟⎠
⎝ d(1 − t) ⎟⎠
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by income not only has an enormous
impact on the estimates, but yields overall
estimates that are driven by a tiny fraction
of high–income ﬁlers. For example, excluding the 100 most inﬂuential observations
(just 0.2 percent of the sample), as measured by a dfbeta test, lowers the estimated
ETI for the 1980s from 0.37 to 0.08.5
While the dfbeta tests suggest that the
Continuous Work History Survey (CWHS)
estimates may be imprecise because of
the small number of very–high–income
observations, estimates are generally very
similar after adding data from primarily
high–income tax ﬁlers to the sample. While
the standard errors are much smaller and
the estimates more robust with the larger
dataset, the fact that estimates are often
similar suggests that, despite the small
number of very–high–income ﬁlers, the
CWHS may be a viable dataset for examining behavioral responses to taxation.
The larger dataset also includes additional demographic information. This
information (age, gender, and itemization
status), using Gruber and Saez’s preferred
speciﬁcation, has a positive, albeit modest,
affect on the estimated ETI for the 1980s
and a negligible affect on the 1990s estimate. When including this information,
the larger dataset yields an ETI for the
1980s and 1990s combined of 0.34 with a
t–value of over 7.5.
Even with the larger dataset, estimates
for the 1980s and 1990s differ greatly. The
model with demographics and Gruber
and Saez’s richest set of controls yields
an estimated ETI for the 1980s of 0.43 and
for the 1990s, 0.20.6 Including separate

both the efﬁciency and revenue implications of tax–rate changes is more complex
than the formulas suggest. For example,
if the ETI differs by income, an accurate
assessment of either efﬁciency or revenue
implications requires a breakdown of the
responses by income group.4
Despite a great deal of variation in ETI
estimates, both across studies and within
studies that explore different speciﬁcations, several recent papers have reported
an overall ETI of about 0.40. An often–cited
study by Gruber and Saez (2002) examines
responses to the tax cuts of 1981 and 1986,
and ﬁnds an overall estimated ETI of 0.40.
However, Kopczuk (2005) ﬁnds similarly
estimated results to be quite sensitive to
sample selection and model speciﬁcation.
Both Giertz (2006) and Heim (2007) also
report estimates for the 1990s that are very
sensitive to an array of factors. Others
(e.g., Saez (2004) and Goolsbee (1999))
report great heterogeneity in estimated
responses across time periods.
The estimation portion of this paper ﬁrst
replicates Gruber and Saez’s core results
by applying their techniques to a dataset
that is similar to the one that they used.
My results for the 1980s closely parallel
Gruber and Saez’s results. Applying the
same methodology to 1990s data and to
data from both the 1980s and 1990s combined, however, yields estimated ETIs that
are much smaller than corresponding estimates for the 1980s. In fact, using Gruber
and Saez’s preferred speciﬁcation yields an
estimated ETI for the 1990s that is a little
more than half my corresponding estimate
for the 1980s. Weighting regression results
4

5

6

In addition, when external costs or beneﬁts are present, assessing efﬁciency implications is also more complex.
For example, suppose tax rates rise and, in response, taxable income falls, but a portion of that drop in taxable
income comes from increased charitable contributions (and suppose those charities produce positive externalities). Or suppose that a tax increase is used to ﬁnance an underprovided public good. In such instances, the
standard deadweight loss formula will overstate the efﬁciency cost of an increase in tax rates.
Excluding inﬂuential observations is not done to produce a “better” estimate, but rather to test whether a
handful of observations may be driving the overall results. In fact, dropping observations in the manner
described likely biases the estimates.
Restricting the sample to those with over $100,000 in taxable income does not affect the ETI estimate for the
1980s and raises the estimate for the 1990s to 0.23. However with the higher income cutoff, the estimated ETI
for both decades combined rises by 30 percent, to 0.44.
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and nonlinear controls for mean reversion and divergence within the income
distribution narrows this difference, lowering the 1980s estimate to 0.40 and raising
the 1990s estimate to 0.26. Additionally,
work by Kopczuk (2005) implies that
changes to the tax base since 1986 (IRS,
1979–1998) could account for as much as
14 to 29 percent of this difference. However, this still leaves the vast majority of
the difference in estimates between the
two time periods unexplained.
When turning to a more encompassing income measure, broad income,
substantial variation in estimated elasticities for the 1980s and 1990s is also
observed. For the 1980s, the estimated
broad income elasticity is 0.21. For the
1980s, the corresponding estimate is 0.13.
While the estimated broad income elasticity is much lower for the 1980s than the
1990s, the 1990s estimate represents a
larger share of the corresponding taxable
income elasticity estimate than does the
1980s estimate. Heterogeneous income
elasticity estimates across tax changes
is not a new ﬁnding. Saez (2004), using
aggregated time–series data, ﬁnds great
variation in income responses to tax
changes over years 1960 to 2000. And
Goolsbee (1999), using repeated cross–sections of data for selected years between
1920 and 1966, also finds substantial
variation in estimated responses across
tax changes.

most attention in this section because the
approach used to control for those trends
represents the most novel aspect of the
model employed in this study—a model
developed by Gruber and Saez (2002). The
approach also takes into account other
factors, such as mean reversion, tax–rate
endogeneity, institutional changes (which
often coincide with changes in the rate
structure), and differences between transitory (or temporary) fluctuations and
permanent (or longer–term) responses.
(For a discussion of these issues and the
related literature, see Giertz (2004) and
Slemrod (1998).)
Controlling for Exogenous Trends in
Income
The centerpiece of Gruber and Saez’s
approach is its controls for non–tax–
related heterogeneous shifts in income
distribution and mean reversion. Over the
past 30 years, the distribution of reported
income has widened. In fact, that trend
accelerated in the 1980s, especially at the
top of the distribution.7 Because people
with the highest income pay a disproportionate share of taxes—the top one
percent pay approximately one–third of
all federal income taxes—their behavior
is especially important (see Internal Revenue Service (2004)). Not fully accounting
for the portion of that income growth
that is unrelated to tax policy can result
in large biases. For example, the 1980s
cuts in marginal tax rates were greatest
at the top of the income distribution and,
thus, inversely correlated with the great
income growth at the top of the distribution. If the exogenous (non–tax–related)
portion of that income growth is not fully
accounted for, that trend will bias ETI
estimates upward. Because this income

ISSUES IN THE ANALYSIS
While taxes affect income growth, so do
many other economic factors. Controlling
for non–tax–induced trends in taxable
income is a major obstacle to accurately
estimating elasticities. The issue of non–
tax–related trends in income is given the
7

According to Piketty and Saez (2003), the share of income reported by the top ten percent of ﬁlers rose by
more than a third, from 32.9 percent in 1979 to 41.4 percent in 1998; two–thirds of that increase went to the
top one percent of taxpayers. The share of income reported by the top one–half of one percent more than
doubled, the share reported by the top one–tenth of one percent nearly tripled, and the share reported by the
top one–hundredth of one percent more than quadrupled.
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trend has been irregular, distributional
changes in years without tax changes may
not provide useful measures of exogenous
shifts that occur during periods with tax
changes.
Although changes to the income distribution are widely documented and
theories such as heterogeneous (and
diverging) returns to education and experience help explain the phenomenon, the
underlying driving factors are not well
understood, nor are the year–to–year
deviations from that trend.8 The fact that
the exogenous–income trend has persisted
through periods of both increases and
decreases in the level and progressivity of
income tax rates suggests that it is, in large
part, not a direct response to tax changes.
Furthermore, Saez and Veall (2005) ﬁnd an
income trend at the top of the Canadian
income distribution that closely parallels that in the U.S.—despite a different
pattern of tax changes in Canada with
much more modest reductions in marginal tax rates. That notwithstanding, the
possibility that the phenomenon results
from a longer–run and more–nuanced
response to tax changes cannot entirely
be ruled out. Note that the progressivity
(especially within the top one percent of
the income distribution)9 of both the U.S.
and Canadian tax systems has declined
substantially since 1970, as the concentration of income held by this group has
risen substantially in both countries.
By contrast, tax progressivity at the top
of the French income distribution has
remained stable (or possibly increased),
while the income concentration at the top
of the French income distribution too has
remained relatively stable (Piketty and
Saez, 2007).
8
9

10

Controlling for Mean Reversion
Mean reversion also complicates estimation. Over a person’s lifetime, income often
follows a general path, with many ﬂuctuations. After income has been particularly
high or low, it will often revert to a more
normal path. That reversion is especially
pronounced at the tails of the distribution.
People at the high end of the income distribution are often not there for long, and will
likely have a substantial drop in income
that is unrelated to tax policy. At the other
extreme, students will often have large
increases in income when they enter the
workforce. Estimating the ETI without fully
controlling for mean reversion will erroneously count non–tax–related increases
(by people below their lifetime path) and
decreases (by those above their lifetime
path) in taxable income as responses to
changes in tax rates. Those factors bias ETI
estimates in opposite directions, depending
on whether tax rates are raised or lowered,
but there is no reason to believe the biases
will cancel each other out.
Research into the ETI is also complicated by the fact that the ETI appears
to vary with income, rising as income
increases.10 If so, a single overall elasticity
will not be applicable when considering
the impact of rate changes that target only
part of the income distribution or that
differ across the distribution. In addition,
a meaningful average overall estimated
ETI must take into account the correlation between income and the elasticities.
The average response of all ﬁlers may be
very different from an income–weighted
estimate that reﬂects how taxable income
(and to a lesser extent tax revenue) as a
whole will respond.

For possible explanations driving the divergence at the top of the income distribution, see Lemieux (2006).
That is, within the top one percent of income, taxes as a share of income continue to increase with income;
however, for 1970 the increase was very steep, whereas today it is modest.
People with higher incomes generally have more opportunities to respond to tax changes (see Saez (2004)).
They generally itemize their tax returns, rely less on wage and salary income, and have more control over the
timing and source of their income than do other groups. People with more modest incomes can alter their
labor supply, but may have few other alternatives for altering their taxable income.
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sorted by the randomly assigned values
and the strata sampling probability is
used to determine the cut point for inclusion into the SOI. Because the individual
maintains the same random value over
time and because the stratum sampling
probability simply determines the cut
point for inclusion in the sample, once
included in the SOI, an individual is automatically included in future years if his
income remains the same or if his income
increases because this would either put
him in the same stratum or in a stratum
with a higher sampling probability, thus
maintaining or lowering the cut point
for inclusion. Therefore, an individual
observed in the base year is much more
likely to be observed in the future year if
his income rises than if it falls. In fact, the
probability that one is observed in two
different years is simply the minimum
of the strata sampling probabilities for
the two years. This raises the potential
for spurious correlation between the
dependent variable (ln(incomet/incomet+1))
and the independent variables, including
the tax variable. To avoid this possibility,
(paired) observations from the full SOI
are weighted by the reciprocal of their
probability of appearing in the sample.11
This strategy is discussed in Imbens and
Lancaster (1996) and in Auten and Carroll
(1999), who employ this strategy using
similar data.12
This paper follows Gruber and Saez
(2002) in comparing behavior over three–
year intervals, using only people who
ﬁled tax returns in both the base (or initial) year and the third subsequent year.
The overall SOI sample includes nearly
700,000 paired observations, with over
218,000 from the CWHS. For base years
1979 to 1998, the CWHS sample includes
just 113 returns with taxable income

DATA AND METHODS
This paper uses data on individual tax
returns from the Statistics of Income (SOI)
for years 1979 through 2001. The SOI is
a stratiﬁed random sample of tax ﬁlers,
compiled by the Internal Revenue Service,
and includes all information reported on
ﬁlers’ tax returns, plus additional demographic information. In addition to the full
SOI, the Continuous Work History Survey
(CWHS), a conﬁdential version of the data
used by Gruber and Saez (2002), is used
for the replication phase of the paper, as
well as for some of the sensitivity analysis.
The CWHS is a subset of ﬁlers from the
SOI who are followed from year to year.
Although the CWHS contains detailed
and accurate information, it is deﬁcient
in two important respects. First, although
the CWHS sample is quite large (for some
years, more than 20,000), relatively few
returns are from the very top of the income
distribution. If high–income taxpayers
dominate an estimate, that estimate using
the CWHS will depend heavily on just a
few ﬁlers. This shortcoming of the CWHS
can be overcome by moving to the full SOI,
which heavily over–samples high–income
ﬁlers. Second, the CWHS (and the full SOI)
includes only people who ﬁle returns and
are listed as the primary ﬁlers. Thus, attrition is an issue.
While selection into the CWHS is
designed to be random, selection into
the full SOI is conditional on several factors, including income. More speciﬁcally,
each individual is assigned a number at
random, which does not change from
year to year. For each year, tax returns are
separated into strata based on AGI and the
forms and schedules used by the ﬁlers.
Sampling probabilities vary by strata and
reach 100 percent for very–high–income
filers. The returns in each stratum are
11

12

For paired observation, the sampling probability is simply the minimum of the sampling probabilities for the
two observations used in constructing the pair.
Additionally, income–weighted results for the full SOI are produced by simply multiplying all weights by
income.

747

NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL
and Saez, income measures are adjusted
by the growth in broad income, where
broad income equals total income minus
realized capital gains and Social Security
beneﬁts, using 1990 as the base.16 More
speciﬁcally,

greater than $1,000,000, while the full
SOI includes 113,673 such returns.13 (The
CWHS includes just four ﬁlers with taxable income over $5,000,000, while the full
SOI includes 21,365.)
Income measures are deﬁned according to 1990 law. Over time, both tax rates
and the deﬁnition of taxable income itself
change. Deductions are permitted in some
years and not others. The deﬁnition of
income can affect responses to changes
in tax rates (Slemrod and Kopczuk,
2002). Furthermore, estimated responses
of income to changes in tax rates may be
spurious if the deﬁnition of income also
changes between the two periods and a
concurrent (as opposed to constant–law)
deﬁnition of income is used (Slemrod,
1996).14 For the 1980s and 1990s, the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86) presents the
biggest obstacle to creating a constant law
deﬁnition of income. Because deductions
and exclusion were more generous pre
TRA 86, it is easier to construct a constant
law measure based on post–TRA–86
law.15 Imposing 1990 law on pre–TRA–86
returns generally results in larger taxable
income measures than under pre–TRA–86
law. Additionally, it is assumed that these
ﬁlers would have opted for the standard
deduction (at the 1990 level, but adjusted
for inflation) instead of their itemized
deductions, if their itemized deductions based on 1990 law are less than
the standard deduction. As with Gruber
13
14

15

16

17
18

broad income = AGI – capital gains
– supplemental (Schedule E) income
or loss + dividends excluded from AGI
+ unemployment compensation not
included in AGI + Keogh and traditional
IRA contributions + forfeited interest
penalties + alimony paid.
As with most studies in this literature,
capital gains are excluded from the
analysis because they are only observed
when they are realized, and not when
they accrue. Social Security beneﬁts are
excluded because they are not observed in
all years. Schedule E income is excluded
because it can change dramatically from
the shifting of income between Subchapter
S and Subchapter C corporations. Subchapter S income is reported on Schedule
E, whereas Subchapter C income is generally not observed at the individual level.17
(Additionally, Schedule E income was
affected by changes to both depreciation
rules and passive loss rules.) The other
income measure, taxable income, equals
broad income less the value of exemptions
and the greater of the standard or itemized
deductions.18

This is based on incomes in 1992 dollars, as adjusted by rates of growth in broad income.
For example, before TRA 86, 40 percent of capital gains were included in taxable income. Post TRA 86, all capital
gains were included. Thus, even if capital gains realizations remained unchanged by TRA 86, a concurrent
income deﬁnition would show taxable income from capital gains rising by 150 percent.
Information on many of the sources of pre–TRA–86 deductions and exclusions are not reported after 1986.
However, many of the post–TRA–86 deductions and exclusions were reported on (or can be imputed from)
pre–reform returns.
The adjustment for broad–income growth is analogous to adjustments that transform nominal dollars into
real dollars. Thus, for this paper, each individual’s reported income is divided by the ratio of average broad
income in 1990 over the average broad income in the year of the observation.
This issue is discussed in more detail later.
Eligible deductions from AGI include: moving expenses, IRA and Keogh payments, medical expenses exceeding
7.5 percent of AGI, state and local income taxes, real estate and property taxes, mortgage interest and payments for deductible points, charitable contributions, net casualty deduction, as well as other miscellaneous
deductions.
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The sample includes only those with
broad income greater than $10,000 in
the base year and positive income in the
future year. Without those restrictions,
the SOI sample is about 20 percent larger,
and the CWHS sample is about 25 percent
larger. Mean taxable base–year income,
after adjusting by the growth rate in
broad income, is $28,311 for the CWHS
sample and $26,961 for the full SOI. For
broad income, these numbers are $45,065
and $43,581, respectively (see Table 1).19
In nominal dollars, mean taxable income
ranges from $10,739 in 1979 to $25,308
in 1998 for the CWHS; the corresponding means for broad income range from
$17,442 to $43,289. Individual marginal
tax rates (both state and federal) are
imputed using the Congressional Budget
Ofﬁce’s internal tax calculators.20
The CWHS sample is very similar to
data used by Gruber and Saez, but differs in several respects. First, Gruber and
Saez use a publicly available version of
the CWHS, which is slightly modiﬁed in
order to protect the identity of taxpayers
in the sample. Second, Gruber and Saez’s

sample ends in 1990, whereas my sample
extends to 2001. Third, Gruber and Saez
use the National Bureau of Economic
Research’s (NBER) TAXSIM model to
impute their federal and state marginal
tax rates, whereas I use the Congressional
Budget Ofﬁce’s internal tax calculators.
Because Gruber and Saez did not
use the full SOI, they did not need to
employ the weighting strategy discussed
above. They did weight their results by
income, though. Weighting by income is
intended to produce estimates reﬂective
of the change in total reported taxable
(or broad) income, which relates directly
to the change in income–tax revenues. If
responses were homogeneous throughout
the reported income distribution, weighting would not affect the results. But, as a
number of studies, including Gruber and
Saez, have found, the ETI varies by income
and is generally much larger for the
highest–income ﬁlers. Weighting should
produce estimates that are more indicative
of overall responses, but, at the same time,
the importance of weighting suggests that
the model ﬁt may be poor.

TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS: CWHS VERSUS SOI
Paired Observationsa
Paired Observations 1980s
Paired Observations 1990s
Returns with Base Year Taxable Income Greater than:
$1,000,000
$5,000,000
Mean Base Year Taxable Incomeb
Mean Baseyear Broad Incomeb
Mean Federal Tax Rate
Mean State Tax Rate
Mean Net–of–Tax Rate
Mean Federal Tax Liabilityb
Mean State Tax Liabilityb

CWHS

SOI

193,809
54,136
139,673

699,724
250,140
449,584

113
4
$28,311
$45,065
21
4
75
6,246
1,361

113,673
21,365
$26,961
$43,581
21
4
75
5,720
1,241

Notes: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data from 1979 to 2001. Filers with less than $10,000 of broad
income are excluded.
a
Sample sizes are for the taxable income regressions.
b
Income and tax liabilities are expressed in 1992 dollars, as adjusted by the growth in broad income. Averages
for the SOI are weighted to reﬂect the population of tax ﬁlers.

19

20

SOI averages are weighted to reﬂect a random sample. Without such weighting, the corresponding means are
$641,978 for taxable income and $818,212 for broad income.
Jon Bakija designed the state tax calculator used by the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (see Bakija (2006)).
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income trends are explored. This is done
by including explanatory variables based
on one–year lagged income and the difference between base–year income and the
one–year lag as separate variables (and
in place of the log of base–year income).
(Gruber and Saez also include a variable
to separate the income effect from the
substitution effect. They conclude that the
income effect is not important and, thus,
exclude it from most of their analysis.) In
addition to extending the years of data
and adding more high–income ﬁlers, I also
add a richer set of demographic information (demog), including age, gender, and
itemization status.

The methodology follows directly
from Gruber and Saez (2002). The income
growth rate equals
⎛ 1 − taxratet + 3 ⎞
⎛ incomet + 3 ⎞
= α t + ξ ⋅ ln ⎜
ln ⎜
⎝ 1 − taxratet ⎟⎠
⎝ incomet ⎟⎠
+ mars ⋅ β1 + spline(incomet ) ⋅ β 2
+ demog ⋅ β 3 + ε t .21
The dependent variable is log of income
in the future year (incomet+3) divided by
income in the base year (incomet), where
the future year is three years after the
base. (The key independent variable
equals the log of the net–of–tax rate in the
future year divided by the net–of–tax rate
in the base year.) To avoid endogeneity
between the tax rate and income, a ﬁrst
stage regression is run to produce and
exogenous measure of the log change in
the net–of–tax rate.22 The coefﬁcient on
that variable, ξ, represents the ETI. Control variables include year–ﬁxed effects,
dummies for marital status (mars), and a
ten–piece spline of the log of base–year
income. The spline is intended to control
for mean reversion and for non–tax–
related income trends that have differed
across the reported income distribution
in recent decades. Alternative speciﬁcations employed by Gruber and Saez and
in this paper include a model with the
log of base–year income in place of the
spline and a speciﬁcation that excludes the
income control altogether. Additionally
and following Kopczuk (2005), speciﬁcations that include separate controls for
mean reversion and non–tax–related
21
22

23

RESULTS
This section begins by replicating
Gruber and Saez’s approach for the
1980s using the CWHS sample and then
compares the two sets of results. Next,
the same methodology is applied to the
1990s and to the full period, spanning
1979 to 2001.23 After a discussion of those
results, the importance of income–weighting regressions is examined. Next, a dfbeta
test is conducted and the sensitivity of the
estimated ETIs to the exclusion of handfuls of the most inﬂuential observations
is examined.
The CWHS analysis is followed by
results for each of the periods from the full
SOI. The full SOI is also used to examine
the inﬂuence that several different factors
have on the estimates. First, the affect of
additional demographics is examined.
Second, the model is altered to include

Note that, for simplicity, subscripts denoting the individual are omitted here.
The instrument is constructed by inﬂating base–year income by the growth in mean broad income over the
three–year interval. Next, the tax calculator computes counterfactual tax rates based on the inﬂated income
measure. Finally, two–stage least squares (2SLS) is employed, where, in the ﬁrst stage, the log change in the
actual net–of–tax rate is regressed against the counterfactual (or imputed) log change in the net–of–tax rate,
along with the other independent variables.
Estimates for the 1980s tax changes use data from 1979 to 1990. Because each observation contains information
from the base year and information on the same ﬁler three years later, base years for the 1980s range from 1979
to 1987. Estimates for the 1990s tax changes use data from 1988 to 2001, with base years ranging from 1988 to
1998.
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separate controls for mean reversion and
divergence within the income distribution.
Third, the model is estimated for responses
due to variation in federal tax rates and
then again for variation in state tax rates.
Finally, the ETI is re–estimated for a sample
that includes only high–income ﬁlers.24

ten–piece spline yields an estimated ETI in
the neighborhood of 0.4 and a corresponding estimated elasticity of broad income of
0.12.25 The fact that the estimated elasticities for broad income are so much lower
than the corresponding ETI estimates
suggests that a substantial portion of the
taxable–income response may come via
deductions and exemptions. Another
contributing factor may be that the
denominator for the broad–income calculation is larger, by deﬁnition; thus, for
an identical dollar change, the estimated
broad–income elasticity will be smaller
than the corresponding ETI estimate.
Smaller broad–income elasticities are consistent with Kopczuk’s (2005) ﬁnding that
income responses are a function of the tax
base and that the greater is the availability
of exemptions and deductions, the lower
is the cost of responding to tax changes
and, hence, the larger is the response.

Replicating Gruber and Saez
Each pair of the six columns of Table
2 reports Gruber and Saez’s estimated
elasticities for the 1980s (for broad income
and taxable income) under the following speciﬁcations: with no controls for
exogenous income trends, with the log of
base–year income as a control, and with
a ten–piece spline of log income (Gruber
and Saez’s preferred speciﬁcation). My
comparable estimates for the same period
are presented in Table 3. Despite using a
slightly different data set and different
marginal tax rate calculators, the two
sets of results are quite similar. Estimated
with no control for base–year income,
the elasticities are negative, which is
inconsistent with theoretical predictions.
Adding the log of base–year income to
the model results in an estimated ETI of
just above 0.6 and a substantially smaller
broad–income elasticity of 0.17. Replacing the log of base–year income with the

CWHS Results for the 1990s
The same methodology generates estimated ETIs for the 1990s that are much
smaller than those for the 1980s and not
statistically signiﬁcant, despite a sample
size of nearly 140,000 (see Table 4). Gruber
and Saez’s preferred speciﬁcation, which
includes a ten–piece spline, yields an esti-

TABLE 2
INCOME–WEIGHTED ESTIMATES FOR THE 1980s
(Gruber and Saez (2002) Results)
none

log income

10–piece spline

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

Elasticity

–0.30
(0.120)

–0.462
(0.194)

0.17
(0.106)

0.611
(0.144)

0.12
(0.106)

0.40
(0.144)

Observations

69,129

59,199

69,129

59,199

69,129

59,199

Income Controls:

Notes: This is a partial reproduction of Table 4 from Gruber and Saez (2002).

24

25

Estimates throughout this section are based on 2SLS, where, as discussed in the previous section, counterfactual
net–of–tax rates are used as instruments for the actual rates—since the actual rate is endogenous. Throughout
the analyses, instruments in the ﬁrst–stage regressions show strong statistical signiﬁcance (both as measured
by F statistics and by t statistics for the estimated coefﬁcients on the counterfactual tax variables).
As with Gruber and Saez, when including a ten–piece spline, broad income elasticities are never statistically
different from zero (at the ﬁve percent level).
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TABLE 3
REPLICATED RESULTS FOR THE 1980s
none

log income

10–piece spline

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

Elasticity

–0.248
(0.113)

–0.369
(0.111)

0.166
(0.113)

0.625
(0.146)

0.124
(0.110)

0.373
(0.160)

Married

0.003
(0.012)

–0.079
(0.016)

0.064
(0.016)

0.043
(0.022)

0.073
(0.015)

0.078
(0.021)

Single

–0.016
(0.013)

–0.072
(0.017)

–0.014
(0.014)

–0.063
(0.021)

–0.014
(0.014)

–0.048
(0.021)

–0.100
(0.018)

–0.200
(0.018)
0.000
(0.000)

–0.818
(0.033)

decile 2

–0.892
(0.219)

–0.567
(0.040)

decile 3

–0.205
(0.052)

–0.376
(0.053)

decile 4

–0.140
(0.053)

–0.409
(0.063)

decile 5

–0.217
(0.059)

–0.220
(0.074)

decile 6

–0.068
(0.059)

–0.224
(0.083)

decile 7

–0.122
(0.063)

–0.260
(0.089)

decile 8

–0.133
(0.068)

–0.218
(0.079)

decile 9

–0.019
(0.100)

–0.278
(0.085)

decile 10

–0.086
(0.048)

–0.074
(0.039)

Income Controls:

ln(income)
Spline: decile 1

Constant

–0.091
(0.014)

0.008
(0.018)

0.940
(0.187)

1.982
(0.180)

0.657
(0.139)

7.422
(0.257)

Observations

60,092

54,136

60,092

54,136

60,092

54,136

Notes: Estimates are based on Continuous Work History Survey data for 1979 to 1990. Estimates are from 2SLS
regressions. The income range is $10,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by income. All regressions include
dummies for marital status and dummies for each base year. Robust standard errors (clustered by individual)
are in parentheses.

percent (from 0.63 to 0.37). Note that controlling for changes in income inequality
may be more complex for the 1990s than
for the 1980s, since top incomes, while
trending upward, show much greater
variation in the 1990s.

mated ETI of 0.20, or slightly more than
half the size of my estimate for the 1980s.
Replacing the log of base–year income
with a spline has little impact on the estimated ETI for the 1990s, but reduces the
estimate for the 1980s by more than 40
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TABLE 4
INCOME–WEIGHTED CWHS ESTIMATES FOR BOTH DECADES
none

log income

10–piece spline

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

Elasticity

0.475
(0.105)

0.738
(0.168)

0.184
(0.094)

0.177
(0.137)

0.148
(0.097)

0.195
(0.144)

Married

–0.015
(0.008)

–0.122
(0.014)

0.087
(0.011)

0.063
(0.017)

0.08
(0.009)

0.086
(0.015)

Single

–0.039
(0.010)

–0.090
(0.016)

–0.014
(0.010)

–0.042
(0.017)

–0.014
(0.010)

–0.027
(0.017)

–0.099
(0.010)

–0.162
(0.013)
0.00
(0.000)

–0.827
(0.021)

decile 2

0.00
(0.000)

–0.504
(0.024)

decile 3

–0.243
(0.045)

–0.408
(0.031)

decile 4

–0.186
(0.030)

–0.293
(0.039)

decile 5

–0.109
(0.030)

–0.27
(0.046)

decile 6

–0.135
(0.034)

–0.277
(0.046)

decile 7

–0.039
(0.035)

–0.168
(0.049)

decile 8

–0.172
(0.036)

–0.232
(0.057)

decile 9

0.097
(0.049)

0.067
(0.071)

decile 10

–0.122
(0.021)

–0.155
(0.028)

1.588
(0.134)

0.128
(0.019)

7.313
(0.156)

139,673

158,679

139,673

Income Controls:

ln(income)
Spline: decile 1

Constant

–0.067

–0.033

0.952

Observations

(0.011)
158,679

(0.019)
139,673

(0.103)
158,679

Notes: Estimates are based on Continuous Work History Survey data for 1979 to 2001. Estimates are from 2SLS
regressions. The income range is $10,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by income. All regressions include
dummies for marital status and dummies for each base year. Robust standard errors (clustered by individual)
are in parentheses.
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TABLE 5
INCOME–WEIGHTED CWHS ESTIMATES FOR BOTH DECADES
none

log income

10–piece spline

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

Elasticity

0.121
(0.077)

0.192
(0.103)

0.174
(0.078)

0.305
(0.099)

0.149
(0.080)

0.298
(0.100)

Married

–0.01
(0.007)

–0.113
(0.011)

0.082
(0.010)

0.056
(0.015)

0.079
(0.008)

0.085
(0.013)

Single

–0.028
(0.008)

–0.083
(0.012)

–0.012
(0.009)

–0.047
(0.014)

–0.012
(0.009)

–0.032
(0.014)

–0.099
(0.009)

–0.165
(0.013)
0.00
(0.000)

–0.817
(0.017)

decile 2

0.00
(0.000)

–0.524
(0.021)

decile 3

–0.266
(0.031)

–0.385
(0.027)

decile 4

–0.167
(0.025)

–0.334
(0.033)

decile 5

–0.122
(0.026)

–0.265
(0.039)

decile 6

–0.131
(0.028)

–0.25
(0.041)

decile 7

–0.069
(0.029)

–0.196
(0.043)

decile 8

–0.151
(0.032)

–0.253
(0.047)

decile 9

0.074
(0.048)

0.01
(0.065)

decile 10

–0.116
(0.020)

–0.14
(0.026)

Income Controls:

ln(income)
Spline: decile 1

Constant

–(0.090)

Observations

0.012
218,771

(0.027)
0.015

(0.917)
0.096

(1.638)
0.129

0.094
(0.015)

7.301
(0.133)

193,809

218,771

193,809

218,771

193,809

Notes: Estimates are based on Continuous Work History Survey data for 1979 to 2001. Estimates are from 2SLS
regressions. The income range is $10,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by income. All regressions include
dummies for marital status and dummies for each base year. Robust standard errors (clustered by individual)
are in parentheses.
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Although the ETI estimates are much
smaller for the 1990s than for the 1980s, the
corresponding estimated broad–income
elasticities are slightly larger (although
still not statistically different from zero).
Including the spline yields an estimated
broad–income elasticity for the 1990s of
about 0.15, compared with 0.12 for the
1980s (see Table 3 and Table 4).
The ETI estimates for the different time
periods suggest that mean reversion at the
top of the income distribution (i.e., falling
incomes) dominates the secular income
trend (of rising top income shares) and
that this may result in estimates that are
biased in different directions depending
on whether tax rates are raised or lowered. The likelihood or degree of this bias
depends on the base–year income controls included in the regression. Without
base–year income controls, estimates for
the 1980s are much smaller—in fact, well
below zero—than with controls, but, for
the 1990s, the opposite is true: estimates
without income controls are much larger
than those with controls. Mean reversion at
the top of the income distribution implies
drops in income for the 1980s that are
negatively correlated with the net–of–tax
rate, which is rising. For the 1990s, similar
drops in income are positively correlated
with the net–of–tax rate, which is falling.
People at the top of the income distribution have a relatively high probability of
experiencing a substantial drop in income,
but people with moderate incomes have
only a small probability of experiencing
tremendous income gains needed to push
them to the top of the distribution.

higher than the average of the estimates
for the 1980s and 1990s. The speciﬁcation
with the log of base–year income produces
an estimated ETI of 0.31, which is higher
than the 1990s estimate of 0.18 but is only
half the corresponding 1980s estimate of
0.63. Once again, estimated broad–income
elasticities are stable: 0.15 with the spline
and 0.17 (and statistically signiﬁcant) with
the log of income control.

CWHS Results for the Full Sample Period

0
10
25
50
100

Weighting and Sensitivity to Sample
Selection
With many estimation techniques, a
small number of outliers can exert a heavy
inﬂuence on the estimated coefﬁcients; in
such case the estimates may not be indicative of the behavior of much of the sample.
As a case in point, Slemrod (1996) ﬁnds
evidence suggesting that just one taxpayer
may have been responsible for a substantial
portion of several of the estimates reported
by Feldstein (1995). That possibility seems
remote when regressions are unweighted
and include well over 50,000 observations.
With income–weighting, however, that is
not necessarily the case. With income–
weighting, large numbers of taxpayers
with lower reported incomes might exert
much less inﬂuence on the overall results
than might a few very–high–income ﬁlers.
In fact, re–estimating Tables 4–6 without
using income weights dramatically lowTABLE 6
THE EFFECT OF EXCLUDING THE MOST
INFLUENTIAL OBSERVATIONS OF INCOME–
WEIGHTED ESTIMATES FOR THE 1980sa
Dropped
Observations

Sample Size

Estimated ETI

54,136
54,126
54,111
54,086
54,036

0.373
0.235
0.174
0.116
0.084
Notes: Estimates are based on Continuous Work History Survey data for years 1979 to 1990.

Not surprisingly, the same techniques
applied to the full CWHS sample (from
1979 to 2001) generally result in estimated
ETIs that are smaller than those for the
1980s and larger than those for the 1990s.
The speciﬁcation with the ten–piece spline
yields an estimated ETI of 0.30, or slightly

a
Estimates are based on the specification with a
10–piece spline. Observations are dropped based on
the size of their impact on the estimated ETI and as
measured by a dfbeta test.
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ers the estimated ETIs for all time periods,
suggesting that overall responsiveness is
negligible.26 In order to further test the
sensitivity of my estimates to very inﬂuential observations, I exclude as many
as 100 observations that most affect the
income–weighted estimates.
A dfbeta test for the 1980s sample measures the inﬂuence of each observation on
the overall ETI estimate. For each observation, the dfbeta test calculates the difference between the estimated coefﬁcient
with and without that observation. Taxable–income elasticities for the 1980s are
re–estimated based on the speciﬁcation
with the ten–piece spline and excluding
the observations with the largest dfbetas
(in absolute value). Observations are
excluded not to improve the ETI estimates,
but rather to test the model’s sensitivity
to small numbers of observations. Dropping the ten most inﬂuential observations
reduces the estimated ETI by more than
35 percent, to 0.24. Dropping the 25 most
inﬂuential observations further lowers
the estimated ETI to 0.17, more than 50
percent below the initial estimate. Excluding the 100 most inﬂuential observations
(0.2 percent of the sample) lowers the estimated ETI to 0.08, 77 percent lower than
the initial estimate (see Table 6). Thus,
despite the large sample size, income
weighting results in estimates that are
highly sensitive to just a few observations.
For the most part, the most inﬂuential
observations are taxpayers with very
high taxable incomes who also report
large changes in taxable income between
the base year and the future year. Again
note that dropping observations is likely
biasing the estimates and that the purpose
of this exercise is not to produce a better
estimate, but to show that the overall estimates may be heavily dependent on a few
observations. This result is not especially
26

27

surprising because just a small slice of
the CWHS sample is used to represent
the segment of top income earners who
are responsible for a very large share of
overall income and tax revenues.
Results from the Full SOI
The analysis thus far calls into question the level of precision with which the
CWHS–based taxable income responses
are estimated. Despite a sample size of
well over 50,000 for the 1980s, estimated
ETIs are extremely sensitive to a tiny
number of the most inﬂuential observations. Furthermore, despite a sample size
of close to 140,000, estimated ETIs for the
1990s are far from statistically signiﬁcant.
Although sample sizes are quite large, the
number of really high–income ﬁlers is very
small. This, plus income–weighting the
regressions, results in coefﬁcients that are
driven by a small number of observations.
Additionally, for the 1990s a large fraction
of the observations experience no change
in tax rates because the 1990 and 1993 tax
acts only changed tax rates for those in
the upper tax brackets. Fortunately, this
shortcoming of the CWHS can be overcome by turning to the full SOI, which, as
discussed in the previous section, heavily
over–samples high–income ﬁlers.
Given the sensitivity of the CWHS estimates, it is surprising that, for the most part,
estimated ETIs from the full SOI are quite
similar to the CWHS estimates.27 For the
1980s, the estimate ETI is 0.43 (versus 0.37
with the CWHS) with a t–value of over 5.2
(see Table 7). For the 1990s, the estimated
ETI is 0.20, almost exactly the same as the
CWHS estimate, but with a t–value of 3.3
(versus 1.35 with the CWHS) (see Table 8).
For both decades combined, the estimated
ETI is 0.34 (versus 0.30 with the CWHS)
with a t–value of 7.5 (see Table 9).

However, including the log of base–year income, instead of a spline, results in estimated ETIs that are much
larger and similar to those from the identically speciﬁed income–weighted model.
The full SOI estimates also include the richer set of demographic variables, but exclude state dummies. Including state dummies does very little to the estimates.

756

The Elasticity of Taxable Income over the 1980s and 1990s
TABLE 7
FULL SOI TAXABLE AND BROAD–INCOME ELASTICITIES FOR THE 1980s
Base–Year Income Controls

Spline Income Controls

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

ln(mtrt+3/mtrt)

–0.033
(0.036)

–0.001
(0.059)

0.309
(0.048)

0.648
(0.081)

0.210
(0.048)

0.425
(0.081)

Married

0.079
(0.008)

0.011
(0.011)

0.118
(0.008)

0.069
(0.012)

0.140
(0.009)

0.096
(0.012)

Single

0.014
(0.008)

–0.012
(0.012)

0.023
(0.008)

0.007
(0.012)

0.031
(0.008)

0.028
(0.012)

Age

0.045
(0.003)

0.072
(0.004)

0.056
(0.004)

0.086
(0.005)

0.065
(0.004)

0.10
(0.005)

Age Squared/10

–0.011
(0.001)

–0.017
(0.001)

–0.013
(0.001)

–0.019
(0.001)

–0.015
(0.001)

–0.022
(0.001)

Age Cubed/100

0.008
(0.000)

0.011
(0.001)

0.009
(0.001)

0.012
(0.001)

0.010
(0.001)

0.014
(0.001)

sex

0.007
(0.001)

0.007
(0.001)

0.006
(0.001)

0.004
(0.001)

0.005
(0.001)

0.003
(0.001)

itemzer_base

–0.004
(0.004)

–0.039
(0.006)

–0.055
(0.005)

–0.117
(0.008)

–0.069
(0.005)

–0.126
(0.008)

–0.091
(0.005)

–0.145
(0.008)

decile 1

–0.918
(0.186)

–0.610
(0.016)

decile 2

–0.219
(0.017)

–0.235
(0.018)

decile 3

–0.169
(0.018)

–0.213
(0.025)

decile 4

–0.123
(0.022)

–0.168
(0.030)

decile 5

–0.142
(0.022)

–0.176
(0.033)

decile 6

–0.041
(0.027)

–0.021
(0.034)

decile 7

–0.004
(0.024)

–0.069
(0.031)

decile 8

–0.033
(0.041)

0.006
(0.054)

decile 9

–0.066
(0.054)

–0.136
(0.100)

decile 10

–0.137
(0.035)

–0.131
(0.069)

7.738
(1.732)

4.119
(0.157)

248,940

250,140

No Income Controls

ln(income)

Constant
Observations

–0.73

–1.12

(0.054)
248,940

(0.073)
250,140

0.049
(0.070)
248,940

0.111
(0.098)
250,140

Notes: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data for years 1979 to 1990. Estimates are from 2SLS regressions.
The income range is $10,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities and
by income (see the third section). Robust standard errors (clustered by individual) are in parentheses.
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TABLE 8
FULL SOI TAXABLE AND BROAD–INCOME ELASTICITIES FOR THE 1990s
Base–Year Income Controls

Spline Income Controls

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

ln(mtrt+3/mtrt)

0.478
(0.044)

0.745
(0.071)

0.133
(0.038)

0.144
(0.058)

0.125
(0.037)

0.198
(0.060)

Married

0.091
(0.010)

0.013
(0.011)

0.139
(0.009)

0.082
(0.010)

0.137
(0.010)

0.092
(0.011)

Single

0.017
(0.009)

–0.024
(0.011)

0.029
(0.009)

0.002
(0.010)

0.029
(0.009)

0.014
(0.010)

Age

0.016
(0.006)

0.028
(0.007)

0.028
(0.006)

0.043
(0.006)

0.028
(0.006)

0.050
(0.006)

Age Squared/10

–0.006
(0.001)

–0.008
(0.001)

–0.007
(0.001)

–0.010
(0.001)

–0.007
(0.001)

–0.011
(0.001)

Age Cubed/100

0.004
(0.001)

0.006
(0.001)

0.005
(0.001)

0.006
(0.001)

0.005
(0.001)

0.007
(0.001)

sex

0.004
(0.001)

0.002
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

–0.002
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

–0.001
(0.001)

itemzer_base

0.012
(0.005)

–0.023
(0.005)

–0.096
(0.006)

–0.127
(0.006)

–0.083
(0.006)

–0.119
(0.006)

–0.107
(0.004)

–0.120
(0.004)

decile 1

–0.025
(0.022)

–0.554
(0.014)

decile 2

–0.19
(0.021)

–0.201
(0.014)

decile 3

–0.102
(0.018)

–0.170
(0.017)

decile 4

–0.153
(0.020)

–0.147
(0.020)

decile 5

–0.075
(0.020)

–0.021
(0.016)

decile 6

–0.033
(0.013)

–0.053
(0.016)

decile 7

–0.094
(0.015)

–0.097
(0.022)

decile 8

–0.139
(0.026)

–0.204
(0.039)

decile 9

–0.311
(0.064)

–0.314
(0.079)

decile 10

–0.095
(0.046)

–0.08
(0.049)

No Income Controls

ln(income)

Constant

–0.218
(0.096)

–0.304
(0.104)

0.776
(0.100)

0.720
(0.103)

0.080
(0.100)

4.472
(0.150)

Observations

323,776

449,584

323,776

449,584

323,776

449,584

Notes: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data for years 1988 to 2001. Estimates are from 2SLS regressions.
The income range is $10,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities and
by income (see the third section). Robust standard errors (clustered by individual) are in parentheses.
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TABLE 9
FULL SOI TAXABLE AND BROAD–INCOME ELASTICITIES FOR THE 1980s AND 1990s
Base–Year Income Controls

Spline Income Controls

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

ln(mtrt+3/mtrt)

0.168
(0.028)

0.277
(0.045)

0.247
(0.027)

0.359
(0.044)

0.227
(0.028)

0.339
(0.045)

Married

0.081
(0.006)

0.01
(0.008)

0.131
(0.007)

0.074
(0.008)

0.141
(0.007)

0.093
(0.008)

Single

0.012
(0.006)

–0.019
(0.008)

0.029
(0.006)

0.002
(0.008)

0.034
(0.006)

0.017
(0.008)

Age

0.031
(0.004)

0.046
(0.005)

0.041
(0.003)

0.057
(0.004)

0.045
(0.004)

0.068
(0.004)

Age Squared/10

–0.009
(0.001)

–0.012
(0.001)

–0.01
(0.001)

–0.013
(0.001)

–0.011
(0.001)

–0.015
(0.001)

Age Cubed/100

0.006
(0.001)

0.008
(0.001)

0.007
(0.001)

0.008
(0.001)

0.007
(0.001)

0.009
(0.001)

sex

0.006
(0.001)

0.004
(0.001)

0.003
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

0.003
(0.001)

0.000
(0.001)

itemzer_base

0.009
(0.003)

–0.024
(0.004)

–0.076
(0.004)

–0.123
(0.005)

–0.079
(0.004)

–0.125
(0.005)

–0.098
(0.003)

–0.121
(0.003)

decile 1

–0.033
(0.122)

–0.573
(0.011)

decile 2

–0.203
(0.013)

–0.218
(0.011)

decile 3

–0.154
(0.012)

–0.182
(0.014)

decile 4

–0.125
(0.014)

–0.175
(0.017)

decile 5

–0.133
(0.014)

–0.062
(0.015)

decile 6

–0.016
(0.013)

–0.031
(0.015)

decile 7

–0.062
(0.013)

–0.065
(0.018)

decile 8

–0.101
(0.021)

–0.143
(0.030)

decile 9

–0.267
(0.047)

–0.296
(0.058)

decile 10

–0.130
(0.038)

–0.120
(0.037)

No Income Controls

ln(income)

Constant

–0.529

Observations

(0.056)
572,716

–0.749
(0.070)

0.363
(0.062)

0.343
(0.075)

–0.217
(0.112)

4.249
(0.114)

699,724

572,716

699,724

572,716

699,724

Notes: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data for years 1979 to 2001. Estimates are from 2SLS regressions.
The income range is $10,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities and
by income (see the third section). Robust standard errors (clustered by individual) are in parentheses.
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elasticity falls, while the corresponding
measure for taxable income remains
essentially unchanged.
For the 1980s additional demographic
variables raise the estimated ETI from 0.37
to 0.43 and the corresponding estimated
elasticity for broad income from 0.18 to
0.21. For the 1990s, however, the added
variables have almost no effect on the
estimated ETI. For broad income, the corresponding estimated elasticity falls from
0.17 to 0.13. For the full period, the pattern
of the 1980s tends to dominate. Additional
demographics raise the estimated ETI, for
the full period, from 0.28 to 0.34, and the
estimated broad–income elasticity from
0.20 to 0.23.
In most cases, the added demographics show strong statistical significance
(see Table 7, Table 8, and Table 9). Age,
included as a third–order polynomial,
shows strong statistical signiﬁcance (as
measured by F–tests) for both time periods for both broad and taxable income.
Itemizer status is negative and strongly
significant. The effect of (the primary
ﬁler’s) gender, on the other hand, is close
to zero and not statistically signiﬁcant.
The effect of demographics on the estimates implies that those new variables
are somewhat correlated with unobserved

For broad income, the SOI–based
elasticity estimate for the 1980s is much
larger than the estimate from the CWHS
(0.21 versus 0.12). For the 1990s, the
estimates are much closer (0.13 with the
full SOI and 0.15 with the CWHS). For
both decades combined, the estimated
broad–income elasticity is 0.23 (versus
0.15 with the CWHS), but still smaller than
the corresponding ETI estimate. While
the estimates (for broad income) from the
CWHS are never statistically signiﬁcant
at the ﬁve–percent level, the SOI–based
estimates are all statistically signiﬁcant at
well above the one percent level.
Adding Demographics to the Model
Recall that the analysis based on the
CWHS sample excluded all demographic
variables except marital status. When
turning to the full SOI, potentially important variables such as gender, age (as well
as age squared and age cubed) and itemization status are added to the model.28 As
Table 10 shows, including demographics
results in larger estimated elasticities
(when using the model that includes a
ten–piece spline) for the 1980s. The effect
on the estimated elasticities for the 1990s is
mixed; here the estimated broad–income

TABLE 10
INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
Broad Income

Taxable Income
(3)

(1)

(2)

No
0.183
(0.052)

Yes
0.210
(0.048)

No
0.365
(0.083)

Yes
0.425
(0.081)

1988 to 1998

0.174
(0.038)

0.125
(0.037)

0.192
(0.060)

0.198
(0.060)

1979 to 1998

0.198
(0.029)

0.227
(0.028)

0.276
(0.046)

0.339
(0.045)

Added Demographics
1979 to 1987

(4)

Notes: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data. Estimates are from 2SLS regressions. The income range
is $10,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities and by income (see the
third section). Robust standard errors (clustered by individual) are in parentheses.
28

Itemization status is included in order to help capture non–tax–related income patterns that are correlated with
itemizing. The drawback here is that the decision to itemize could be endogenous, and responsive to changes
in tax rates. In any event, excluding itemization status from the added demographic variable has almost no
effect on estimated elasticities for any of the speciﬁcations or time periods.

760

The Elasticity of Taxable Income over the 1980s and 1990s
mate for the 1990s. In one speciﬁcation,
I include both of the control variables
(lagged income and the change in income
from the previous to the current year) in
log form; in the other, I include the same
variables as ten–piece splines. When
including the two variables in log form,
the biggest change is observed for the
1980s, where the estimated ETI rises by
almost 0.05 (when compared to results
from the model that includes the log of
base–year income) (see Table 11). When
including the two logged variables as
ten–piece splines, in place of a ten–piece
spline of log income, the estimated ETI
falls from 0.43 to 0.40, when compared to
the corresponding estimate for the 1980s,
and for the full period, the estimate is
virtually unchanged. For the 1990s the
impact is greater, raising the estimate from
0.20 to 0.26.

(and non–tax–related) factors that determine income changes and, thus, may help
isolate the tax–related portion of changes
in income.29
Separate Controls for Mean Reversion
and Divergence in the Income Distribution
Kopczuk (2005) makes a compelling argument that mean reversion
and non–tax–related divergence in the
income distribution are two separate
phenomena and that it is unlikely that
one variable will capture both effects. To
address this, Kopczuk includes separate
variables to control for each of the two
different phenomena. To account for
mean reversion, Kopczuk includes a
function of income in the year preceding
the base year. To control for divergence
in the income distribution, he includes a
function of the difference between current
(or base–year) income and income in the
preceding year.
To examine the implications of using
one variable to control for both income
divergence and mean reversion, I explore
two speciﬁcations employed by Kopczuk
and ﬁnd that using his strongest set of
controls has a modest and negative effect
on the estimated ETI for the 1980s, but
a larger and positive effect on the esti-

Separately Estimated Responses for
State and Federal Tax Rates
The inclusion of state tax rates in the
marginal rate calculation adds a source
of cross–sectional variation across individuals who may be very similar in other
respects (such as income). Including
this cross–sectional variation may be
important in identifying taxable income

TABLE 11
SEPARATE CONTROLS FOR MEAN REVERSION AND DIVERGENCE IN THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION
1980 to
1987

1988 to
1998

1980 to
1998

ln(taxable incomet–1) and ln(taxable incomet/taxable incomet–1)

0.666
(0.116)

0.191
(0.059)

0.334
(0.053)

Spline of ln(taxable incomet–1) and spline of ln(taxable incomet/taxable incomet–1)

0.400
(0.108)

0.264
(0.060)

0.345
(0.056)

Income Controls

Observations
148,837
350,030
498,867
Notes: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data. Estimates are from 2SLS regressions. The income range
is $10,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities and by income (see the
third section). Robust standard errors (clustered by individual) are in parentheses.
29

Dropping ﬁlers with base–year ages greater than 60 and excluding the age variables results in estimates that
are almost the same as the core results, which include full demographics and impose no age restrictions. This
suggests that retirement patterns, which are often associated with large drops in income, were likely not biasing earlier estimates from datasets that did not include age.
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responses because exogenous income
trends, which are known to ﬂuctuate from
year to year and to vary greatly across
the taxable income distribution, pose
problems for other identiﬁcation strategies. Furthermore, excluding changes to
state rates would likely bias the net–of–tax
rate variable, thus contaminating the ETI
estimates.
A caveat to including state rates is that,
to some degree, state tax rates are likely
endogenous because some people base
their decision to live in a particular state,
at least partially, on its tax system.30 Feldstein and Wrobel (1998) contend that states
are limited in their ability to redistribute
income. A move toward a more progressive state tax system, it is argued, will be
met by out–migration of high–paying
jobs. For this state, pre–tax wages would
rise (and employment would fall) in the
high–skilled sector, resulting in the same
level of after–tax income inequality.31 The
endogeneity of state rates is not necessarily an issue when state rates increase
uniformly across the income distribution,
and these increased revenues are used to
provide services whose beneﬁts are also
widespread. It is much more likely to be
relevant when states alter the progressivity of their tax system, or alter their
rates uniformly without commensurate
changes to government services. 32 In
sum, migration in response to state tax
changes is in itself a behavioral response
to taxation, but one that complicates the
ETI estimation process.33
30

31

32

33

While it is not known how great the role
of interstate migration and wage capitalization is when analyzing changes to state
tax rates, it is possible to estimate elasticities for models that exclude variation
resulting from federal rates, and for models
that exclude variation resulting from state
tax rates. Simply excluding one component
of the overall marginal rate will likely add
little insight because doing so presumes
that one component of the overall marginal
rate is responsible for the entire tax effect.
Thus, the log change in the overall tax rate
is still used as the key dependent variable,
but in one specification the predicted
log change in the state rate is used as an
instrument (instead of the corresponding
change resulting from changes to both
federal and state law) and in the other the
predicted log change for only the federal
rate is used as an instrument. Therefore, on
average the key dependent variable will
be the same as before, but the variation
in this variable will now be based on only
one of the two components of the overall
marginal tax rate.
The model that includes a ten–piece
spline and uses just the federal rate as an
instrument yields estimates that are very
similar to those from the corresponding
model that includes variation from the
combination of federal and state tax rates.
This is true for both broad and taxable
income (see Panel 1 of Table 12).
Including only variation from state
net–of–tax rates yields ETI estimates that
are somewhat smaller than when both

As anecdotal evidence of that possibility, a number of high–paid celebrities have moved their primary residences from high–tax states, such as California, to low–tax states, such as Florida, Texas, and Nevada, which
do not have state income taxes. The phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the “Tiger Woods Effect” (Jones,
2003). Woods, who grew up in California and attended Stanford University, moved his primary residence from
California to Florida shortly after turning professional. Woods recently remarked, “We’re deﬁnitely residing
in Florida and I don’t see why we should leave—especially with zero income tax” (Harig, 2004).
Analogously, transfers to low–income workers will lead to an inﬂow of low–skilled workers, pushing down
their pre–transfer income.
For example, if a state enacts a proportional increase in its tax burden, that does not result in greater or improved government services.
It is likely that migration is motivated by average tax rates, controlling for the level of government services,
as opposed to marginal rates, which drive behavioral responses to federal rate changes (or in situations where
migration is prohibitively expensive).
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TABLE 12
COMPARISON OF ESTIMATES USING FEDERAL AND STATE MARGINAL TAX RATESa
Panel 2: State Rates Only

Panel 1: Federal Rates Only
1979 to 1987

1988 to 1998

1979 to 1998

1979 to 1987

1988 to 1998

1979 to 1998

Taxable Income

0.423
(0.061)

0.212
(0.060)

0.347
(0.038)

0.343
(0.098)

0.105
(0.103)

0.226
(0.066)

Broad Income

0.205
(0.046)

0.11
(0.037)

0.192
(0.026)

0.365
(0.070)

0.081
(0.059)

0.215
(0.041)

Notes: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data. Estimates are from 2SLS regressions and include a
10–Piece Spline of ln(Income). The income range is $10,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by the inverse
of sampling probabilities and by income (see the third section). Robust standard errors (clustered by individual)
are in parentheses. Coefﬁcients other than the elasticities are suppressed.

the permanent responses, differences in
ETI estimates for the two periods may
result simply from noise. To test this
possibility, the ETI is re–estimated after
excluding all paired observations that
include years 1981, 1982, 1986, 1987, 1993,
1994 and 2001. For the full time period, the
overall estimated ETI is 0.30 (versus 0.34
when no years are dropped) and strongly
signiﬁcant. The corresponding estimated
ETI is 0.36 for the 1980s and 0.15 for the
1990s. The fact that the estimates are all
a little smaller than the corresponding
estimates that do not exclude any years
suggests that the overall estimates may
contain both a permanent plus a small
transitory component. However, this is
far from conclusive—especially since the
1980s estimate is no longer statistically
signiﬁcant (see Table 13).

federal and state or only federal rate
changes are included (see Panel 2 of Table
12). The estimated ETI with only variation
from state rates is 0.34 for the 1980s. The
estimated ETI is just 0.11 for the 1990s and
0.23 for the full period. For broad income,
the estimated elasticity is much larger for
the 1980s when including only variation
in state rates (0.37 versus 0.21 when both
state and federal rates are included). For
the 1990s, the estimated broad income
elasticity (0.08) is slightly smaller than the
earlier estimate and much smaller than the
estimate for the 1980s. For the full period,
the estimated broad–income elasticity is
about the same as when only variation
in federal rates is included or when both
state and federal rates are included.
Permanent versus Transitory Responses
While the model is designed to capture permanent rather than transitory
responses, the degree to which is does
this is open to question. Focusing on
changes in behavior over three–year
intervals is intended to isolate permanent
responses. But that comparison may not
remove transitory influences from the
elasticity estimates. Many of the years
in both the 1980s and1990s are likely to
include some transitory behavior, in part
because of multiyear phase–in periods.
Thus, comparing observations three years
apart is unlikely to avoid transitory ﬂuctuations. If those transitory ﬂuctuations
severely contaminate measurement of

Why Might Estimates for the 1980s and
1990s Differ?
Three competing interpretations might
explain the differences between the results
from the 1980s and the 1990s:
1.
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The model does a good job of
explaining overall behavior for
both the 1980s and the 1990s, but
differences in policy and economic
factors caused the ETI to fall between
the two periods. That hypothesis is
consistent with the view of Slemrod
and Kopczuk (2002), who argue that
the ETI is not a structural parameter
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TABLE 13
FULL SOI ESTIMATES AFTER EXCLUDING
YEARS THAT ARE THE MOST LIKELY CONTAIN
TRANSITORY BEHAVIOR
Broad
Income

Taxable
Income

1979 to 1987

0.102
(0.113)

0.356
(0.255)

Obs

64,769

57,709

1988 to 1998

0.076
(0.048)

0.149
(0.074)

Obs

291,611

255,492

1979 to 1998

0.183
(0.040)

0.299
(0.064)

Obs

356,380

313,209

2.

Notes: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income
data. Estimates are from 2SLS regressions and include
a 10–Piece Spline of ln(Income). The income range is
$10,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by the
inverse of sampling probabilities and by income (see
the third section). Robust standard errors (clustered
by individual) are in parentheses. Coefﬁcients other
than the elasticities are suppressed.

and is a function of more than preferences. If the different estimates are
due solely to changes in the base,
then an estimate for the 1990s (or any
other period) can be imputed from
Kopczuk’s estimated coefficients
and a measure of the tax base. 34
Kopczuk’s measure of the tax base,
which is intended to proxy the cost
of shifting income from inside to outside the tax base, has been relatively
constant post–TRA 86. Inserting the
tax base for the 1990s into his estimated equations suggests that the
ETI should be two to four percentage
points lower in the 1990s than it was
pre–1986. That would explain 14 to
29 percent of the difference between
my estimates for the 1980s and 1990s.
Of couse, Kopczuk’s measure is
34

35

an imperfect proxy for the cost of
shielding income from taxation. It is
possible that a better measure would
explain more of the difference (or
possibly less).35
The model is misspeciﬁed and does a
poor job of isolating the response of
taxable income to tax rate changes in
either period—even when employing separate controls for mean reversion and non–tax–related divergence
in the income distribution. During
the 1980s, for example, reported
taxable incomes were rising, and the
share of taxable income reported by
the top of the income distribution
was growing rapidly. At the same
time, marginal tax rates were falling,
with the largest reductions at the
high end of the income distribution.
Thus, the larger estimated ETIs for
the 1980s might occur not because
the true response was greater, but
because the model fails to control
fully for the correlation between
non–tax–related growth in income
(especially at the top of the distribution) and falling tax rates. In the
1990s, the correlation between tax
rates and income was reversed: The
trend in income at the high end continued, and marginal tax rates were
increasing as a result of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1990
and 1993. For the 1990s, the failure
to control fully for that correlation
biases estimated ETIs downward,
the opposite of the upward bias for
the 1980s. Lending credence to that
interpretation is the fact that the
rate cuts of the 1990s applied only
to upper–income groups, which
are usually more responsive to tax

Kopczuk’s measure of the tax base is the share of income subject to tax—i.e., taxable income (plus certain
deductions and exclusions that are not affected by behavior) divided by total income. His model includes
two separate explanatory variables that are functions of the marginal tax rate. One is the net–of–tax rate; the
other is one minus the tax base (share) interacted with the net–of–tax rate.
Another interpretation in support of the model is that people simply respond differently to rate cuts than they
do to rate increases.
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3.

36

rates than are other groups. Thus,
it is somewhat surprising that the
estimated ETI is lower, rather than
higher, for the 1990s.
The model and data may fail to
capture some potentially important
types of income shifting. For example, the shifting of income between
the corporate and individual base
is often not observed. Incentives
for this type of shifting were more
prevalent for the 1980s than for the
1990s. The mostly unobserved shifting of income from subchapter C to
subchapter S corporations following
TRA 86 likely played a large role in
biasing some of the early ETI estimates for TRA 86 (see Slemrod, 1996).
Additionally, Saez (2004) attributes
much of the income increase at the
very top of the income distribution
following ERTA 1981 to a surge in
income from subchapter S corporations. This income surge could have
arisen from a number of sources,
including: tax–induced changes in
real economic activity; the shifting
of income from subchapter C to
subchapter S corporations; and an
exogenous (non–tax–related) change
in economic activity. The potential
measurement problems created from
income shifting between subchapter
C and S, as well as the possibility of
not fully accounting for non–tax–
related changes in economic activity
(that affect subchapter S income) are
mitigated by excluding subchapter
S income from the analysis. It is still
possible that better accounting of
income shifting between corporate
and individual bases—shifting
between subchapters S and C is just
one piece of the puzzle—could help
explain why the estimates for the
two decades are different.

Estimates for High–Income Filers from
the Full SOI
A number of studies have found that
estimated ETIs vary greatly by income,
and that overall responses may be driven
by high–income ﬁlers. While comparing
dollar–weighted and person–weighted
estimates (which are generally much
smaller) also suggests this, the possibility
is explored further by using the full SOI to
generate ETI estimates that apply speciﬁcally to high–income ﬁlers.
Table 14 presents income–weighted ETI
estimates for the 1980s, 1990s, and for both
decades combined after excluding those
with less than $100,000 of base–year broad
income. With that income restriction, the
1980s and 1990s estimates are very similar
to the full–sample SOI estimates for the
respective periods. For both decades combined, though, the estimated ETI is 0.44
(versus 0.34 for the sample without the
higher–income restriction), which is actually larger than either the 1980s or 1990s
estimate.36 Note that restricting the sample
to those with incomes over $100,000 alters
a potentially important source for identiﬁcation. That is, the exclusion reduces
degree of cross–sectional variation in tax
TABLE 14
FULL SOI DOLLAR–WEIGHTED
TAXABLE–INCOME ELASTICITIES
FOR UPPER–INCOME FILERS
Time–Period

ETI
$100k and Up

1979 to 1998

0.441
(0.089)

1979 to 1987

0.426
(0.148)

1988 to 1998

0.232
(0.098)

Notes: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income
data for years 1979 to 2001. Estimates are based on
the speciﬁcation with a 10–piece spline. Regressions
are weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities
and by income (see the third section). Robust standard
errors (clustered by individual) are in parenthesis.

The estimate for the 1980s (for those with income over $100,000) is 0.43. For comparison, Gruber and Saez,
using the CWHS, reported an estimated ETI of 0.57 when making this same restriction to the sample.
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ful data source for examining behavior
often dominated by very–high–income
ﬁlers. A third ﬁnding is that using separate
control variables for mean reversion and
divergence within the income distribution has a modest and negative effect on
estimated ETIs for the 1980s and a positive
and larger effect on estimates for the 1990s
(when compared to results from analogous
models that include just one variable to
account for both phenomena).
The addition of high–income ﬁlers from
the SOI, along with a panel that spans over
20 years and includes both tax increases
and tax decreases, yields results that are
more robust than many previous studies.
This paper suggests a relatively narrow
range of plausible estimates for the ETI.
However, the factors that underlie income
changes are tremendously complex and
there remains variation across speciﬁcations and across time periods that is not
well understood. Furthermore, other
credible studies suggest a wider range of
plausible estimates (see Giertz (2006) and
Heim (2007)).

rate changes and, thus, the behavior of
those with less than $100,000 of income
is no longer used to help explain counterfactual income trends. Whether this
hampers or improves the identiﬁcation
process depends partly on whether the
non–tax–related behavior of the excluded
group is similar to that of the included
higher–income group.
CONCLUSION
This paper builds on Gruber and Saez
(2002). In addition to replicating Gruber
and Saez’s core results using CWHS
data, a number of sensitivity analyses
are conducted, including extending the
data through the 1990s—so that the full
period includes both tax increases and tax
decreases. After ﬁnding evidence that the
CWHS results may not be robust because
of the small number of very–high–income
ﬁlers, the analysis is repeated using the
full SOI—a much larger dataset that
includes the CWHS, but also heavily
over–samples high–income ﬁlers.
One important finding is that when
employing identical methodologies,
estimated ETIs for the tax increases of
the 1990s are generally much smaller
(about half the size) than estimates for
the tax cuts of the 1980s. A second ﬁnding
is that although sample sizes are quite
large, CWHS–based ETI estimates for the
1990s are not statistically signiﬁcant. This
is partly due to income–weighting the
regressions, which places much greater
emphasis on the responses of high–income
ﬁlers and, thus, makes the size of the sample somewhat misleading. Additionally,
despite the large sample size, a dfbeta test
for the 1980s shows that results depend
heavily on a few very–high–income observations. However, moving to the full SOI
results in estimated ETIs that are generally similar in magnitude to the CWHS
estimates, but with much smaller standard
errors. This suggests that the CWHS, while
inferior to the full SOI, may well be a use-
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